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requires that we find an indirect way to do so, similar to what we do in
case of temperature. (Recall that we don’t measure temperature directly
within the cgs system of units but indirectly; usually, in terms of the cgs
unit length, e. g., the length of the barometric column.) Now, for the sake
of the argument, assume we actually found a way to measure all intensive
magnitude indirectly in terms of (an appropriately chosen complex of) cgs
units, and, to keep things simple, assume further that all such measures
were convertible to length. All that granted, von Kries would still argue
that all these e↵orts would result in the production of utterl meaningless
statements. Mu¨ller’s speculations on peculiar nerve energies made canonical
by his student Helmholtz was the undisputed doctrine of the time which
rendered all such comparisons impossible.12 Accordingly, Helmholtz wrote,
[the di↵erence among perceptions of distinct senses] is so grave
that any transition from one to the other, any relation of lesser
or greater similarity is excluded. For example, one can’t even
start to ask whether sweet is more similar to blue than it is to
red.13
and von Kries joins in:
The statement that a sound and a light movement are the same
is without meaning. It is probably deplorable but the nature of
the beast that what I’m stating here is not amenable to proper
demonstration beyond the appeal to the facts of inner experience.
Is the di↵erence between red and yellow greater or lesser than
that between c and d? No one will consider an answer to this
question admissible.14
12See, e. g., propositions III, V, and VII, in [Mu¨ller, 1840], pp. 251, 254, 261, for Mu¨ller’s
doctrine of the “peculiar ‘energy’ of each nerve of sense;” [Helmholtz, 1878], p. 219, or
[Helmholtz, 1856], p. 584, for Helmholtz’s notion of “modality.” I’d expect synesthetes to
have second thoughts on this.
13[Helmholtz, 1856], p. 584, [der] Unterschied in der Modalita¨t der Empfindung [. . . ] ist
so eingreifend, daß es jeden U¨bergang von einem zum anderen, jedes Verha¨ltnis gro¨ßerer
oder geringerer A¨hnlichkeit ausschließt. Ob z. B. su¨ss dem Blau oder Roth a¨hnlicher sei,
kann man gar nicht fragen. Even for Wundt, who was somewhat critical of Helmholtz (see
[Wundt, 1874], vol. 2, p. 424, footnote), it went without sating that a “sound, a color, or
sensation of warmth or cold etc. are beyond comparison in respect to the objective content
of their sensation” (Ein Ton, eine Farbe, eine Wa¨rme- oder Ka¨lteempfindung usw. sind
ihrem Empfindungsinhalte nach unvergleichbar, ibid., p. 412).
14[Kries, 1882], p. 274, Die Behauptung, sie seien gleich, hat keinen Sinn [. . . ] z. B.
einer Schall- und einer Lichtbewegung. Es ist vielleicht bedauerlich, liegt aber in der
Natur der Sache, dass, was ich hier behaupte, nicht eigentlich bewiesen werden kann [. . . ]
6
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“a concatenation of words no meaning can be associated with,” and, conse-
quently, debates on psycho-physical laws are not caused by a disagreement
on facts but are trifle quarrels about words.22
It was when he wrote down this ideas on measurement that it occurred
to von Kries that he can’t square those views with the idea that probabilities
measure certain intensive magnitudes, namely, degrees of belief or degrees
of (un)certainty.
It seemed impossible to harmonize the categorical non-measur-
ability of psychological phenomena with degrees of expectation
conceived of as a measurement of a psychological attitude.23
Beyond such general reservations von Kries thought it to be a compelling
case of reductio that equal probabilities reflect same degrees of belief; since
the latter are without meaning the former can’t hold either—well, provided,
of course, we assume a subjectivist interpretation of probabilities. But
Laplace had made a subjectivist notion of equal probability the cornerstone
of probability theory.
The theory of chances consists in reducing all events to a certain
number of equally possible ones, namely, those concerning which
we are equally undecided.24
I have no doubt that von Kries became painfully aware that his views on
measurement robbed probability theory its Laplacian foundation. His con-
clusion was that probabilities, if they can’t be psychological, must be logical
a↵airs.25 Note, however, that, for von Kries, “logic” had the uniquely broad
meaning it had especially in 19th Century Germany where the “doctrines of
method” (Methodenlehre)—which formerly had been eking out an existence
as the red-haired stepchild of logic since it was conceived by the Logic of Port
Royal—was completely blown out of proportion and covered what today we
22ibid., p. 293 (footnote on Wundt), eine Zusammenstellung von Worten, mit der
sich kein Sinn verbinden la¨sst; ibid., p. 294, keine sachliche Di↵erenz, sondern ein auf
Missversta¨ndnis beruhender Streit um Worte.
23[Kries, 1925], p. 32 seq., Mit der grundsa¨tzlichen Unmeßbarkeit psychischer Verha¨ltnis-
se schien es nicht in Einklang zu bringen [sein], wenn [. . . es sich hier] um die Messung
eines psychischen Verhaltens, einer Erwartungs |sta¨rke, handelt; see also [Kries, 1886],
pp. 3 seqq.
24[Laplace 1814], p. viii, La the´orie des hasards consiste a` reduire tous les e´ve´nements
[. . . ] a` un certain nombre des cas galement possibles, cest-a`-dire tels que nous soyons
e´galement inde´cis.
25See, [Kries, 1886], pp. 5 seqq., [Kries, 1925], p. 33.
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114 CHAPTER 1. KANT
Kant’s distinction between “subjective” and “objective validity” (subjektiv/objektiv
gu¨ltig; [1800, p. 513]) was his means to render the di↵erence between “plausibility”
(Scheinbarkeit) and “probability” (Wahrscheinlichkeit). 16 Both notions had seen a
rich and varied histo y which did not enforce a particular meani g, 17 so Kant was
free to choose one. In agreement with Meier’s Excerpts , Kant associated proba-
bility with uncertain knowledge based on objective grounds and plausibility with
uncertain knowledge based on subjective grounds.
In case of probability, then, the ground of holding-to-be-true is objectively
valid, while in case of mere plausibility it is only subjectively valid. 18
[1800, p. 513]
Let p be an uncertainly known proposition. Now, whether p is probable or plau-
sible depends on whether the su cient ground for p is known or not. For, if one
is able to compare the insu cient grounds one has for believing p with the su -
cient ground, then p is probable. Knowledge of the su cient ground is objective
knowledge; thus probable knowledge rests, though being uncertain, on objecti-
ve grounds. In addition, the su cient ground provides a measure of the degree
of (un-)certainty. Assign complete certainty to the knowledge of the su cient
ground and set its degree as 1, and assign the degree 0 to the complete ignoran-
ce of the su cient ground. The certainty of partial knowledge of the su cient
ground corresponds then directly to a degree of certainty in the intervall [0, 1].
Probable knowledge comes therefore with its own (numerical) measure of certain-
ty. The proposition p is plausible, however, if the su cient ground is not known.
For then the uncertain knowledge is based solely on the comparison of subjec-
tive grounds and counter-grounds for believing p. Lacking the su cient ground,
plausible knowledge lacks also a measure.
Kant’s second distinction is the one between “mathematical” (mathematischer)
and “philosophical probability” (philosophischer Wahrscheinlichkeit). It is based on
the idea that the grounds for the holding-to-be-true of a proposition p can be
either “homogenous” (gleichartig) or “heterogeneous” (ungleichartig). It is not en-
tirely clear what Kant had in mind here; but it seems to come to the following.
If one is able to determine a priori the probabilities of an event’s outcomes, the
grounds are homogenous; otherwise heterogeneous. An example in case were the
throw of a die; assuming a fair die, one can say a priori that the probability
to throw any one face is 1/6. The su cient reason were the set of all possible
outcomes; its knowledge, i. e., the knowledge that one of the faces will show, is
16. Scheinbarkeit (plausibility) was the German expression Kant used when his Latin sources
had verisimilitudo and Wahrscheinlichkeit (probability) was used accordingly for the Latin
probabilitas.
17. See [Buldt 200?].
18. Bei der Wahrscheinlichkeit ist also der Grund des Fu¨rwahrhaltens objektiv gu¨ltig, bei
der bloßen Scheinbarkeit dagegen nur subjektiv gu¨ltig. – The explanations to follow are a free
paraphrase of the relevant text of the Ja¨sche Logic, [1800, p. 513]; additional material from
earlier lecture notes in logic will be separately acknowledged.
Kant:!
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certain and gets assigned the degree 1.
Mathematical probability is a fraction, where the su cient ground of truth
is the denominator, while the insu cient grounds that I have for taking-
to-be-true are the numerator. 19 [1966, p. 196]
An example for heterogeneous probability were then the problem of assessing the
credibility of a witness at court. 20
It suggested itself—at least for Kant—to let the two distinctions collapse
and even to give it a contemporary ring by identifying the two with objective
and subjective probability in the current sense. Mathematical probabilities are
objective and objectively certain, while philosophical probabilities are subjective
and subjectively certain.
Probability lies in the object itself, in the thing that is to be known; plau-
sibility, on the other hand, lies in him who has no knowledge of a thing.
21 [1966, p. 145]
Just like Kant was eager to neatly separate the methodological approaches ade-
quate for mathematics and philosophy—with the result, that both proceed, neces-
sarily, entirely di↵erent and that hence it is forbidden for a philosopher to mimic
the mathematician (see [KrV, B 740–766]—his distinction between mathematical
and philosophical probability lead him likewise to conclude that Leibniz’ demand
for a logica probabilium is unsatisfiable and were, if carried out, an inadmissible
transgression of borders inherent to the two disciplines.
Hence, a logic of probability is an impossible undertaking. 22 [1966, p. 883]
Kant said so in direct opposition to Wol↵, who was quite positive about Leibniz’
logic of probability and its possibility. 23
19. Die [mathematische] Wahrscheinlichkeit ist ein Bruch, wo der zureichende Grund der
Wahrheit der Nenner ist, die unzureichenden Gru¨nde des Vorwahrhalten aber, welche ich habe,
sind der Za¨hler. (Blomberg Logic)
20. The example of throwing a die and the accompanying explanations can be found in the
Blomberg , Dohna-Wundlacken, and Vienna Logic (see [AA 24, pp. 196 seqq., 742, 880 resp.]).
The example of a testimony for an accused is adduced in the Dohna-Wundlacken and Vienna
Logic (see [AA 24, p. 742, resp. pp. 880, 883]). The connection between knowing the su cient
ground and calculating the probability is foreshadowed already in Wol↵’s Logic, where we read
that he who knows all prerequisites for truth, the su cient reason, is in this given case able to
estimate the probability (“Qui novit requisita ad veritatem omnia, seu rationem su cientem
[. . . ] is in dato casu singulari probabilitatem æstimare valet;” [1728, § 1160]).
21. [D]ie Wahrscheinlichkeit [. . . ] lieget in dem Object selbst, in der Sache, welche erkanndt
werden soll: die Scheinbahrkeit aber hingegen lieget in dem, welcher keine Erkenntniß von einer
Sache hat. (Blomberg Logic)
22. Daher ist eine Logic der Wahrscheinlichkeit ein unmo¨gliches Unternehmen. (Vienna
Logic) – The same conclusion is drawn in [1800, p. 513]. I do not know a comprehensive
treatment on Leibniz’ logica probabilium in English, but a short characterization (in English)
of at least two aspects of Leibniz’ work in probability theory can be found in [Hacking 1975,
chs 13–15].
23. Wol↵, with reference to the works by Huygens, the three Bernoullis, (de) Montmort and
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2.2. FRIES ON INDUCTION IN HIS LOGIC 181
stuck to traditional logic when it came to forms of inference. Under the heading
“disjunctive inferences of reason” he did not o↵er a form of inference related to
the disjunctive judgment but gave, in accordance with the textbook of his time,
modus ponens and modus tollens instead. 28 Fries now took the step Kant did
not. He introduced a third form a inference, and in order to distinguish it from
“disjunctive inference” in the old sense he called it “divisive inference of reason”
(divisiver Vernunftschluß) 29. The underlying idea was just Kant’s. Kant wrote:
Finally, the disjunctive judgment contains a relation of two or more propo-
sitions to each other, a relation not, however, of logical sequence, but of
logical opposition, in so far as the sphere of the one excludes the sphere of
the other, and yet at the same time of community, in so far as the propo-
sitions taken together occupy the whole sphere of knowledge in question.
Each of these propositions occupies a part of the sphere of the possi-
ble knowledge; all of them together occupy the whole sphere. There is,
therefore, in a disjunctive judgment a certain community of the known
constituents, such that they mutually exclude each other, and yet thereby
determine in their totality the true knowledge. 30 [Kant KrV, B 99]
Fries, the Kantian he was, took over Kant’s suggestion to consider the disjunctive
judgment as a form of judgment that deserves separate mention and treatment.
Fries, the corrector of Kant he was, refined Kant’s proposal by the distinction be-
tween what he called a “conjunctiv” (conjunctiv), respectively a “disjunctive divisive
judgment” (conjunctiv divisives Urteil).
Furthermore, the divisive judgments are, then, either conjunctive, if they
represent a conjunction, or disjunctive, if they represent a disjunction. The
conjunctive ones have the form: A is B and C. The disjunctive judgments
have the form: A is either B or C. 31 [Fries 1811, pp. 102 seq.(= § 32)]
28. See [Kant 1800, § 77]; by restricting any disjunction to a dichotomy the appended notes
even contradict the notion of disjunctiveness as given in the Critique.
29. See [Fries 1811, pp. 181 seqq. (= § 60). “Inference of reason” (Vernunftschluß) merely
is the idiosyncratic name Kant introduced for “syllogism,” a terminology Fries took over; see
[Buldt 2001b, c] for why Kant did so. Outside quotations I will, for brevity’s sake, use “syllogism”
instead of “inference of reason.”
30. Endlich entha¨lt das disjunktive Urteil ein Verha¨ltnis zweener, oder mehrerer Sa¨tze gegen
einander, aber nicht der Abfolge, sondern der logischen Entgegensetzung, so fern die Spha¨re des
einen die des andern ausschließt, aber doch zugleich der Gemeinschaft, in so fern sie zusammen
die Spha¨re der eigentlichen Erkenntnis ausfu¨llen [. . . ] Jeder dieser Sa¨tze nimmt einen Teil der
Spha¨re des mo¨glichen Erkenntnisses [. . . ] ein, alle zusammen die ganze Spha¨re. [. . . ] Es ist also
in einem disjunktiven Urteil eine gewisse Gemeinschaft der Erkenntnisse, die darin besteht, daß
sie sich wechselseitig einander ausschließen, aber dadurch doch im Ganzen die wahre Erkenntnis
bestimmen [. . . ].
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Fries, the corrector of Kant he was, refined Kant’s proposal by the distinction be-
tween what he called a “conjunctiv” (conjunctiv), respectively a “disjunctive divisive
judgment” (conjunctiv divisives Urteil).
Furthermore, the divisive judgments are, then, either conjunctive, if they
represent a conjunction, or disjunctive, if they represent a disjunction. The
conjunctive ones have the form: A is B and C. The disjunctive judgments
have the form: A is either B or C. 31 [Fries 1811, pp. 102 seq.(= § 32)]
28. See [Kant 1800, § 77]; by restricting any disjunction to a dichotomy the appended notes
even contradict the notion of disjunctiveness as given in the Critique.
29. See [Fries 1811, pp. 181 seqq. (= § 60). “Inference of reason” (Vernunftschluß) merely
is the idiosyncratic name Kant introduced for “syllogism,” a terminology Fries took over; see
[Buldt 2001b, c] for why Kant did so. Outside quotations I will, for brevity’s sake, use “syllogism”
instead of “inference of reason.”
30. Endlich entha¨lt das disjunktive Urteil ein Verha¨ltnis zweener, oder mehrerer Sa¨tze gegen
einander, aber nicht der Abfolge, sondern der logischen Entgegensetzung, so fern die Spha¨re des
einen die des andern ausschließt, aber doch zugleich der Gemeinschaft, in so fern sie zusammen
die Spha¨re der eigentlichen Erkenntnis ausfu¨llen [. . . ] Jeder dieser Sa¨tze nimmt einen Teil der
Spha¨re des mo¨glichen Erkenntnisses [. . . ] ein, alle zusammen die ganze Spha¨re. [. . . ] Es ist also
in einem disjunktiven Urteil eine gewisse Gemeinschaft der Erkenntnisse, die darin besteht, daß
sie sich wechselseitig einander ausschließen, aber dadurch doch im Ganzen die wahre Erkenntnis
bestimmen [. . . ].
Fries:
! The outcome of rolling the die (= A) is either
! even (= B) or uneven (= C)
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2.2. FRIES ON INDUCTION IN HIS LOGIC 181
stuck to traditional logic when it came to forms of inference. Under the heading
“disjunctive inferences of reason” he did not o↵er a form of inference related to
the disjunctive judgment but gave, in accordance with the textbook of his time,
modus ponens and modus tollens instead. 28 Fries now took the step Kant did
not. He introduced a third form a inference, and in order to distinguish it from
“disjunctive inference” in the old sense he called it “divisive inference of reason”
(divisiver Vernunftschluß) 29. The underlying idea was just Kant’s. Kant wrote:
Finally, the disjunctive judgment contains a relation of two or more propo-
sitions to each other, a relation not, however, of logical sequence, but of
logical opposition, in so far as the sphere of the one excludes the sphere of
the other, and yet at the same time of community, in so far as the propo-
sitions taken together occupy the whole sphere of knowledge in question.
Each of these propositions occupies a part of the sphere of the possi-
ble knowledge; all of them together occupy the whole sphere. There is,
therefore, in a disjunctive judgment a certain community of the known
constituents, such that they mutually exclude each other, and yet thereby
determine in their totality the true knowledge. 30 [Kant KrV, B 99]
Fries, the Kantian he was, took over Kant’s suggestion to consider the disjunctive
judgment as a form of judgment that deserves separate mention and treatment.
Fries, the corrector of Kant he was, refined Kant’s proposal by the distinction be-
tween what he called a “conjunctiv” (conjunctiv), respectively a “disjunctive divisive
judgment” (conjunctiv divisives Urteil).
Furthermore, the divisive judgments are, then, either conjunctive, if they
represent a conjunction, or disjunctive, if they represent a disjunction. The
conjunctive ones have the form: A is B and C. The disjunctive judgments
have the form: A is either B or C. 31 [Fries 1811, pp. 102 seq.(= § 32)]
28. See [Kant 1800, § 77]; by restricting any disjunction to a dichotomy the appended notes
even contradict the notion of disjunctive ess as given in the Critique.
29. See [Fries 1811, pp. 181 seqq. (= § 60). “Inference of reason” (Vernunftschluß) merely
is the idiosyncratic name Kant introduced for “syllogism,” a terminology Fries took over; see
[Buldt 2001b, c] for why Kant did so. Outside quotations I will, for brevity’s sake, use “syllogism”
instead of “inference of reason.”
30. Endlich entha¨lt das disjunktive Urteil ein Verha¨ltnis zweener, oder mehrerer Sa¨tze gegen
einander, aber nicht der Abfolge, sondern der logischen Entgegensetzung, so fern die Spha¨re des
einen die des andern ausschließt, aber doch zugleich der Gemeinschaft, in so fern sie zusammen
die Spha¨re der eigentlichen Erkenntnis ausfu¨llen [. . . ] Jeder dieser Sa¨tze nimmt einen Teil der
Spha¨re des mo¨glichen Erkenntnisses [. . . ] ein, alle zusammen die ganze Spha¨re. [. . . ] Es ist also
in einem disjunktiven Urteil eine gewisse Gemeinschaft der Erkenntnisse, die darin besteht, daß
sie sich wechselseitig einander ausschließen, aber dadurch doch im Ganzen die wahre Erkenntnis
bestimmen [. . . ].
Fries:
! The outcome of rolling the die (= A) is either
! even (= B) or uneven (= C)
! The outcome of rolling the die (= A) is either
! 1, or 2, or, …, or 6
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2.2. FRIES ON INDUCTION IN HIS LOGIC 181
stuck to traditional logic when it came to forms of inference. Under the heading
“disjunctive inferences of reason” he did not o↵er a form of inference related to
the disjunctive judgment but gave, in accordance with the textbook of his time,
modus ponens and modus tollens instead. 28 Fries now took the step Kant did
not. He introduced a third form a inference, and in order to distinguish it from
“disjunctive inference” in the old sense he called it “divisive inference of reason”
(divisiver Vernunftschluß) 29. The underlying idea was just Kant’s. Kant wrote:
Finally, the disjunctive judgment contains a relation of two or more propo-
sitions to each other, a relation not, however, of logical sequence, but of
logical opposition, in so far as the sphere of the one excludes the sphere of
the other, and yet at the same time of community, in so far as the propo-
sitions taken together occupy the whole sphere of knowledge in question.
Each of these propositions occupies a part of the sphere of the possi-
ble knowledge; all of them together occupy the whole sphere. There is,
therefore, in a disjunctive judgment a certain community of the known
constituents, such that they mutually exclude each other, and yet thereby
determine in their totality the true knowledge. 30 [Kant KrV, B 99]
Fries, the Kantian he was, took over Kant’s suggestion to consider the disjunctive
judgment as a form of judgment that deserves separate mention and treatment.
Fries, the corrector of Kant he was, refined Kant’s proposal by the distinction be-
tween what he called a “conjunctiv” (conjunctiv), respectively a “disjunctive divisive
judgment” (conjunctiv divisives Urteil).
Furthermore, the divisive judgments are, then, either conjunctive, if they
represent a conjunction, or disjunctive, if they represent a disjunction. The
conjunctive ones have the form: A is B and C. The disjunctive judgments
have the form: A is either B or C. 31 [Fries 1811, pp. 102 seq.(= § 32)]
28. See [Kant 1800, § 77]; by restricting any disjunction to a dichotomy the appended notes
even contradict the notion of disjunctive ess as given in the Critique.
29. See [Fries 1811, pp. 181 seqq. (= § 60). “Inference of reason” (Vernunftschluß) merely
is the idiosyncratic name Kant introduced for “syllogism,” a terminology Fries took over; see
[Buldt 2001b, c] for why Kant did so. Outside quotations I will, for brevity’s sake, use “syllogism”
instead of “inference of reason.”
30. Endlich entha¨lt das disjunktive Urteil ein Verha¨ltnis zweener, oder mehrerer Sa¨tze gegen
einander, aber nicht der Abfolge, sondern der logischen Entgegensetzung, so fern die Spha¨re des
einen die des andern ausschließt, aber doch zugleich der Gemeinschaft, in so fern sie zusammen
die Spha¨re der eigentlichen Erkenntnis ausfu¨llen [. . . ] Jeder dieser Sa¨tze nimmt einen Teil der
Spha¨re des mo¨glichen Erkenntnisses [. . . ] ein, alle zusammen die ganze Spha¨re. [. . . ] Es ist also
in einem disjunktiven Urteil eine gewisse Gemeinschaft der Erkenntnisse, die darin besteht, daß
sie sich wechselseitig einander ausschließen, aber dadurch doch im Ganzen die wahre Erkenntnis
bestimmen [. . . ].
Fries:
! The outcome of rolling the die (= A) is either
! even (= B) or uneven (= C)
! The outcome of rolling the die (= A) is either
! 1, or 2, or, …, or 6
! Complications due to syllogistic form
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2.2. FRIES ON INDUCTION IN HIS LOGIC 181
stuck to traditional logic when it came to forms of inference. Under the heading
“disjunctive inferences of reason” he did not o↵er a form of inference related to
the disjunctive judgment but gave, in accordance with the textbook of his time,
modus ponens and modus tollens instead. 28 Fries now took the step Kant did
not. He introduced a third form a inference, and in order to distinguish it from
“disjunctive inference” in the old sense he called it “divisive inference of reason”
(divisiver Vernunftschluß) 29. The underlying idea was just Kant’s. Kant wrote:
Finally, the disjunctive judgment contains a relation of two or more propo-
sitions to each other, a relation not, however, of logical sequence, but of
logical opposition, in so far as the sphere of the one excludes the sphere of
the other, and yet at the same time of community, in so far as the propo-
sitions taken together occupy the whole sphere of knowledge in question.
Each of these propositions occupies a part of the sphere of the possi-
ble knowledge; all of them together occupy the whole sphere. There is,
therefore, in a disjunctive judgment a certain community of the known
constituents, such that they mutually exclude each other, and yet thereby
determine in their totality the true knowledge. 30 [Kant KrV, B 99]
Fries, the Kantian he was, took over Kant’s suggestion to consider the disjunctive
judgment as a form of judgment that deserves separate mention and treatment.
Fries, the corrector of Kant he was, refined Kant’s proposal by the distinction be-
tween what he called a “conjunctiv” (conjunctiv), respectively a “disjunctive divisive
judgment” (conjunctiv divisives Urteil).
Furthermore, the divisive judgments are, then, either conjunctive, if they
represent a conjunction, or disjunctive, if they represent a disjunction. The
conjunctive ones have the form: A is B and C. The disjunctive judgments
have the form: A is either B or C. 31 [Fries 1811, pp. 102 seq.(= § 32)]
28. See [Kant 1800, § 77]; by restricting any disjunction to a dichotomy the appended notes
even contradict the notion of disjunctive ess as given in the Critique.
29. See [Fries 1811, pp. 181 seqq. (= § 60). “Inference of reason” (Vernunftschluß) merely
is the idiosyncratic name Kant introduced for “syllogism,” a terminology Fries took over; see
[Buldt 2001b, c] for why Kant did so. Outside quotations I will, for brevity’s sake, use “syllogism”
instead of “inference of reason.”
30. Endlich entha¨lt das disjunktive Urteil ein Verha¨ltnis zweener, oder mehrerer Sa¨tze gegen
einander, aber nicht der Abfolge, sondern der logischen Entgegensetzung, so fern die Spha¨re des
einen die des andern ausschließt, aber doch zugleich der Gemeinschaft, in so fern sie zusammen
die Spha¨re der eigentlichen Erkenntnis ausfu¨llen [. . . ] Jeder dieser Sa¨tze nimmt einen Teil der
Spha¨re des mo¨glichen Erkenntnisses [. . . ] ein, alle zusammen die ganze Spha¨re. [. . . ] Es ist also
in einem disjunktiven Urteil eine gewisse Gemeinschaft der Erkenntnisse, die darin besteht, daß
sie sich wechselseitig einander ausschließen, aber dadurch doch im Ganzen die wahre Erkenntnis
bestimmen [. . . ].
Fries:!
! !
! !
! !
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Apparently, then, one can find an interpretation of Fries’ claim as to novelty that
makes it state something not outright false.
But the real problem at stake, I think, is not whether the major term is
“totally new,” rather it is the question whether it is new and justified. (Asserting
something new is cheap.) In other words, is incomplete induction according to
Fries, first, really a proof, and second, a syllogism? The answer is intimately
connected with Fries’ theory of probability; hence, I postpone its treatment till
then.
2.3 Fries on probability in his Logic
2.3.1 The place of probabilistic reasoning within Fries’
system
We have started the subsection on induction with a general localization of
induction in the system of logic and have seen that Fries thought of induction
as a particular kind of syllogistic inference. This remains true for probabilistic
inference. Probabilistic inferences, be they inductive, analogical, or probabilistic,
are di↵erent, though, than ordinary categorical or hypothetical syllogisms. In
order to localize the place of probabilistic reasoning in the blueprint of Fries
system we start with Fries’ classification of methods of proof. 57
1. Methods with complete (apodictic) inferences:
a) progressive
b) regressive
↵) speculative
 ) inductive
2. Methods with incomplete inferences or probabilistic inferences:
a) mathematical probability
b) philosophical probability
56. [. . . ] wird im Schlußsatz [. . . ] eine neue Regel gebildet, die in den Pra¨missen gar nicht
vorkam [. . . ] als Regel fu¨r die ganze eingetheilte Spha¨re [. . . ].
57. [Fries 1811, p. 312 seq.(= § 97)]:
1. Verfahren mit vollsta¨ndigen (apodiktischen) Schlu¨ssen.
a) progressiv
b) regressiv
↵) spekulativ
 ) inductorisch
2. Verfahren mit unvollsta¨ndigen Schlu¨ssen oder Wahrscheinlichkeitsschlu¨ssen:
a) mathematische Wahrscheinlichkeit
b) philosophische Wahrscheinlichkeit
Fries:
! Methods of proof
! ! ! • progressive (complete)
! ! ! • regressive (incomplete)
! ! ! ! – speculative
! ! ! ! – inductive
! ! ! ! ! -  complete
! ! ! ! ! -  incomplete
! ! ! ! ! ! ! • mathematical probability
! ! ! ! ! ! ! • philosophical probability
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!
! !
! !
!
! !
! !
! !
! • Genesis of the idea of Spielraum (before 1886)
! ! – Kant on probability (subj/obj; math/philos)
! ! – Fries on probability (disjunctive reasoning)
! ! – Windelband, Lotze, Sigwart, and everyone else
! !
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!
! !
! !
!
! !
! !
! !
! • Genesis of the idea of Spielraum (before 1886)
! ! – Kant on probability (subj/obj; math/philos)
! ! – Fries on probability (disjunctive reasoning)
! ! – Windelband, Lotze, Sigwart, and everyone else
! ! – Spielraum: the word and the concept
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Thank You!
